US Army Has Enough Small Attack Drones but Faces Soldier Training Shortfall

The US Army has reached a critical milestone in its Drone Dominance program: sufficient volume of small, one-way attack drones to equip every squad. However, the service now faces a substantial operational challenge—training enough qualified soldiers to operate these systems, particularly in contested electromagnetic spectrum conditions where adversaries actively attempt to jam or disrupt drone and communications equipment.

Col. Gregory Merkl, the Army's Drone Dominance director, acknowledged this gap in an interview about the program's progress. "We do have the volume to do that. A lot of that has been facilitated by [the Pentagon's] Drone Dominance program," Merkl said, noting that "where we still have some work to do, candidly, is getting everybody trained at the appropriate level." He further emphasized that while the capability exists in every platoon, the Army still needs to "get the qualified pilots down to the squad level."

The Volume Achievement and Its Caveats

The Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth launched the Drone Dominance program in 2025 with an explicit mandate: equip every Army squad with small, one-way attack drones by the end of fiscal 2026. The program has accelerated drone production and fielding through what Merkl described as a "gauntlet-style competition" approach, helping the Army achieve the necessary volume ahead of the fiscal 2026 deadline approaching at month's end.

However, Army officials introduced an important clarification to Merkl's initial statements. A service spokesperson explained to Breaking Defense that because such small drones are attritable—consumed or expended in use—the Army will never actually have "enough" of the systems. More significantly, the spokesperson clarified that while the Army has acquired the quantity of drones needed, "these systems have not yet reached every squad across the Army," though they are "moving quickly to achieve that objective with an agile, sustained process for acquisition, fielding, and replacement."

This distinction between acquiring sufficient hardware and actually fielding it to operational units highlights a pattern common in defense acquisition: production timelines often outpace logistics and distribution capabilities. The Army's acknowledgment reflects the practical reality that having drones in inventory is only the first step; getting them into soldiers' hands requires coordinated distribution and integration with existing unit structures.

The Training and Spectrum Challenge

The more urgent challenge, according to Merkl, centers on operator proficiency in contested electromagnetic environments. Merkl stated that the service is "running a whole series of working groups" within Army headquarters and with interagency partners like the Federal Aviation Administration to help soldiers better understand how to "safely use the spectrum."

This interagency coordination reflects the complexity of electromagnetic spectrum management in military operations. Unlike simple device operation training, spectrum-contested operations require soldiers to understand not only how to launch and control drones but also how to detect jamming attempts, adapt to frequency interference, and maintain command-and-control links when adversaries actively attempt disruption. Such training cannot be conducted in garrison or through classroom instruction alone.

To address this gap, the Army is conducting real-world spectrum-contested training at exercises such as Saber Junction in Germany. During the exercise, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, a drone-focused unit, worked with Ukrainian and NATO counterparts to better understand how to operate in a contested spectrum. These multinational exercises provide invaluable operational learning: soldiers gain hands-on experience operating systems against realistic electromagnetic interference while also building interoperability with allied forces who face similar challenges.

Recurring Acquisition-to-Capability Gaps

The Army's situation illustrates a recurring challenge in modern defense acquisition. The Drone Dominance program successfully accelerated hardware procurement—a traditional procurement bottleneck—by cutting through bureaucratic processes. However, acceleration of the manufacturing and acquisition timeline cannot be matched one-to-one by acceleration of doctrine development, training pipeline expansion, and operational proficiency building.

Training qualified operators at squad level requires time investment that cannot be compressed significantly. Each soldier must learn drone operation mechanics, communications protocols, and—critically—how to maintain operational effectiveness when adversaries attempt to disrupt their systems. The NATO and Ukrainian partnerships evident in exercises like Saber Junction suggest the Army recognizes that spectrum-contested drone operations are not yet well-established doctrine, even among allied militaries.

The timeline pressure is real: with the fiscal 2026 deadline imminent, the Army faces pressure to demonstrate that it has met the Pentagon's mandate to equip every squad. Yet Merkl's candid acknowledgment that training remains incomplete suggests that the service is prioritizing honesty about operational gaps over meeting headline timelines. This reflects an important shift in Pentagon leadership communication under Defense Secretary Hegseth's aggressive acquisition approach—the goal is to accelerate effective capability, not merely to accumulate hardware.

Forward Requirements

The training challenge ahead involves scaling beyond current exercise-level proficiency to force-wide competency. The Army's working groups with the FAA and other interagency partners suggest the service is developing systematic approaches to spectrum-safety training. However, moving from pilot exercises to force-wide training will require significant investment in trainer capacity, simulation systems, and dedicated training time.

The contested spectrum challenge is particularly acute because it fundamentally differs from traditional small-unit training. In a GPS-denied, electronically jamming environment, drone operators cannot rely on automated navigation or standard communication protocols. Instead, they must develop adaptive proficiency and understand enemy electronic warfare tactics—a significantly more demanding training requirement than basic device operation. The fact that the Army is already conducting this training in multinational exercises suggests recognition that this capability gap could undermine the Drone Dominance program's broader strategic objective if left unaddressed.